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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-3240 
 
______________ 
 
THOMAS CALVIN ALEXIS, 
                          Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                            Respondent 
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A 
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
 (A044-251-256) 
Immigration Judge: Leo A. Finston 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 12, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Thomas Alexis seeks review of a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) finding 
him removable for having committed an aggravated felony that resulted in a loss to the 
victims of more than $10,000.  The government asserts that we lack jurisdiction over this 
petition because the BIA’s decision, which remanded the record to the IJ pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(6) “for the purpose of allowing the Department of Homeland Security 
the opportunity to complete or update identity, law enforcement, or security 
investigations or examinations, and further proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of 
an order as provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h),” A.R. 6, was not a final order of removal.  
While we agree that the BIA’s decision was not a final order of removal, our agreement 
is based on a point not raised by either of the parties:  the fact that the IJ never 
determined whether Alexis is or is not a citizen.  
 Before the IJ, Alexis claimed to have derived citizenship from his naturalized 
father.1  At a hearing on July 19, 2017, the IJ, in reviewing the allegations set forth in the 
Notice to Appear (“NTA”), noted that “[a]llegation number one was not established yet.”  
                                                 
1 Alexis based this claim on 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (repealed by Pub.L. 106-395, Title 
I, § 103(a), Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1632), which allows a child to derive citizenship 
from his or her parent under specific circumstances.  Relevant to Alexis, a child qualifies 
for derivative citizenship upon “[t]he naturalization of the parent having legal custody of 
the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents,” so long as the parent’s 
naturalization occurs before the child’s eighteenth birthday and the child is residing in the 
United States as a legal permanent resident.  8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3)-(5).   
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A.R. 78.  Allegation number one states “[y]ou are not a citizen or national of the United 
States.”  A.R. 300.  Subsequently, in her decision, the IJ noted that she “will not address 
[Alexis’s] claim to citizenship to allow the parties to provide additional evidence on this 
issue.”  A.R. 49.  However, nothing in the record indicates that the question of Alexis’s 
citizenship was ever resolved.   
 As we recently recognized, “[t]he Executive cannot deport a citizen.  A ‘claim of 
citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact’ in a removal proceeding.”  
Dessouki v. Att’y Gen., 915 F.3d 964, 967 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).  Because citizens cannot be removed, it is necessary for 
immigration judges to make an initial determination that the individual before them is a 
noncitizen before ruling on the question of removal.  Given that this essential condition 
precedent was not found by the IJ, the removal order is not final.  We therefore must 
dismiss the petition.   
 Note two final points about the scope of our holding. First, because Alexis’s 
unresolved citizenship claim requires us to dismiss, we need not resolve the other 
jurisdictional hurdle on which the parties disagree:  whether Alexis’s removal 
proceedings are final even though the IJ has not yet completed background checks under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h).  See Vakkar v. Att’y Gen., 519 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 196 n.19 (3d Cir. 2008).  Second, while we cannot 
remand with instruction because of the lack of jurisdiction, we nonetheless anticipate that 
the IJ will address the unresolved citizenship claim while considering the other issues on 
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remand from the BIA.2   
                                                 
2 In recommending that a decision be made as to Alexis’s citizenship, we note that 
the laws of Trinidad and Tobago recognize common law marriage and allow for the legal 
separation of couples that have been cohabiting without the necessity of court action.  
Cohabitational Relationships Act, Act No. 30 of 1998, ch. 45:55, sec. 24 (“A man and a 
woman who are not married to each other may enter into a cohabitation agreement or a 
separation agreement for the purpose of facilitating their affairs . . . .”). 
